



By TED LEWIS

Washington, June 27.—The views of Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor on the kind of war that would flare up over Berlin are worth reexamining because in his new post as military adviser to President Kennedy his influence will be felt on every grave decision made to meet a cold-war crisis.

Taylor's views were expressed most clearly in 1959, when he was Army chief of staff and we were in the midst of another Berlin crisis. In essence, his expert opinion was that hostilities, at least at the outset, would amount to a limited war. If the Russians committed only their satellite troops, we would win with our conventional forces.

His testimony was before the Senate Preparedness subcommittee. In reply to a question as to whether "you can defend yourself against the Russians plus their satellites," Taylor's obvious response was no, not without use of nuclear weapons.

But before passing "deliberately to unlimited atomic war" he suggested to the committee, by implication at least, that Moscow should be given a last chance for "it certainly seems to me that, as both sides of the contending power blocs come to have the reciprocal capability of destroying each other, neither side is going to embark on a general atomic war if they can possibly avoid it."

This insight into Taylor's thinking is helpful in trying to determine his stance, as Kennedy's aid, as he faces up to the new Berlin threat. Conferences among the Western Allies are just about to get under way to determine our military posture in another Berlin showdown, as well as over-all policy in diplomatic negotiations.

And it is being pointed out that the President's announcement that he was bringing Taylor into the White House was undoubtedly timed with another purpose in mind—to warn Nikita Khrushchev that the Administration is fashioning military plans for war, if necessary, over Berlin.

The Soviets may not be particularly impressed because Kennedy now has at his right hand probably the most intelligent military brain. But they are impressed certainly because Taylor commanded the Berlin garrison in 1949 and 1950 after the airlift crisis.

As the President's adviser, Taylor gets a title that actually could be bestowed on a flunky, for "military representative of the President" does not necessarily reflect the duties of the office. As the Pentagon brass knows, or has grounds for strongly suspecting, Taylor is in such an influential spot that the most appropriate title could well be deputy commander-in-chief of the nation's armed forces.

### Needed an Expert at His Side

It will not be acknowledged by the White House, but the decision to bring in the retired general came to a head after the Cuban fiasco. Kennedy learned the hard way then that advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not firm, clear advice, but the qualified kind bound to flow from any military group and amounting to a compromise of varying opinions.

Increased rivalry among the services, reaching into the Joint Chiefs of Staff itself, had resulted in his opinion of the inability of the Joint Chiefs to function properly in their role of "principal military advisers to the President."



Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor  
His job a big one

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Otherwise, it would not have been necessary to name Taylor. If the President felt he urgently needed sound military advice, either on the policy or strategic level, and felt confidence in Pentagon chiefs, Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs was handy, or Defense Secretary McNamara.

Kennedy, of course, by naming Taylor, has thus given notice to both McNamara and Lemnitzer that they are not able to give him the kind of advice that he wants.

### CID Under Fire From Kennedy

The fact that Taylor will also advise the President on intelligence matters is significant, and also traces back to Cuba.

The President feels strongly that the Central Intelligence Agency under Allen Dulles let him down in that embarrassing instance and this also had to be straightened out.

Taylor, along with Dulles and Attorney General Robert Kennedy, has been investigating the functioning of the secret agency at the President's request. An oral report has been submitted. What it recommends in detail is any one's guess but Taylor's role on the intelligence level has now become clear.

From the White House, he will operate as the top collector of intelligence material—that available from the secret agencies of the armed services and the State Department, as well as the CIA. He will pass on to the President what he considers important and at the same time give his own estimate of the reliability of the information. He will not ultimately be named to succeed Dulles as CIA chief, but that agency, anyway, will be somewhat downgraded. It will be solely an intelligence operation and will not hereafter be entrusted with cloak-and-dagger assignments, such as arranging revolutions.

### Taylor Will Coordinate Intelligence

From now on when this government decides that our cold-war requirements necessitate promoting this type of violence, the job will be done so sub rosa that it is hoped neither our allies nor enemies will know what we are doing. And if they do suspect, it is hoped that they will not be able to finger the agency we are using.

As the CIA functions under this program, it will be under orders to be totally under cover, to stop leaking tips on its exploits, denials of its failures. It will be supposed to operate on such a hush-hush basis that the nation's capital will start wondering whether it is still in existence, and suspect that if it is, it has moved somewhere far out of town.

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